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 Matthias Knuth 
On Contradictions of ‘Low Wage Policies’1 
The German Example 
1 Introduction 
State policies directly or indirectly concerning low wages are actually dealing with 
three different aspects of economic activity, obviously related to each other but 
nevertheless far from identical: 
(1) low (hourly) wages; 
(2) small (individual) earnings; 
(3) poverty of households despite their engagement in paid work, either during 
working age or after retirement. 
Depending on how the issue is framed, one will arrive at different definitions of the 
problem, different explanations of its causes and thus at different cures. The 
separation of the institutions dealing with these different aspects and the disjunction 
between the respective discourses allows disregarding the contradictions between 
the respective policies. Against this background, it does not come as a surprise that 
Germany lacks a coherent ‘policy for low-wage workers’. The case of Germany may 
be extreme but not unique; it can serve to exemplify contradictions such a policy 
may face in other countries as well. 
The paper is organized along the three fundamental aspects of low wages (2), small 
earnings (3), and in-work poverty (4). Section 2 begins with the promotion of a low-
wage sector and its justifications (2.1), it continues with the empirical proliferation 
of low wages (2.2), and it finally covers the scattered landscape of wage regulation 
and the bumpy road toward statutory minimum wages (2.3). Section 3 points out how 
the German family and employment regime promotes small earnings, particularly for 
women (3.1), how the ‘activating turn’ in labor market policies reinforces this 
tendency (3.2), which appear as a writing on the wall for pensions and old-age 
poverty (Fehler! Verweisquelle konnte nicht gefunden werden.). At the end of the 
pipe made up of low wages and small earnings, we find in-work poverty (4.1), which 
is discussed with regard to the 2005 reform of minimum income benefits (from 
Fehler! Verweisquelle konnte nicht gefunden werden. to 4.2). The Summary and 
Conclusion (5) puts the three aspects together and points to the consequences that 
emerge from a comprehensive view. 
                                            
1  Condensed version of the paper prepared for the Workshop: ‘Welfare States’ Response to Labor 
Market Dualism and Working Poor’, Korea Labor Institute, December 16, 2011 
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2 Low wages 
2.1 Low wages as a virtue? 
Since the early 1970s until 2005, over four full business cycles, German 
unemployment numbers have shown a staircase-shaped pattern where each recession 
produced a rise which was only partially compensated during the following upturn. 
Skill-biased technological change and cyclical selection processes taking effect in 
each successive round of dismissals and hirings resulted in a concentration of low-
skilled workers in the growing stock of the unemployed (Figure 1), and, even more 
markedly, of the long-term unemployed. 
Figure 1: Unemployment rates2 1975 to 1998, overall and unskilled 
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Source: Reinberg 1999 
Growth in the mismatch between skills demand and skills structure of the workforce 
was particularly rapid during the 1990s, due to the German unification, advances in 
globalization and accelerated structural change. Furthermore, due to strong 
competition on the supply side of the labor market, the skills structure among the 
employed was more advanced than the jobs structure; in other words, skilled 
workers displaced unskilled workers in jobs not necessarily requiring completed 
vocational or academic training. In 2008, jobs not requiring the completion of 
vocational or academic training still amounted to 21 per cent (Bellmann und 
Stegmaier 2010, S. 8), whereas only 15.3 per cent of the employed workforce 
actually had no such training in that year (Bundesagentur für Arbeit - Statistik 2011). 
                                            
2  This is the legally defined German unemployment rate (administrative count) which is different from 
the ILO definition of unemployment. 
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As early as 2006, 15.2 per cent of the female and 9.5 per cent of the male active 
workforce were employed below their skills level, according to a survey of working 
conditions (Hall 2010). 
In this situation, during the 1990s and well into the 2000s, the German 
unemployment problem appeared as being primarily a problem of the unskilled to 
many observers (Berthold und Fehn 2000). A dynamic public discourse emerged 
claiming the necessity to develop a ‘low wage sector’. If jobs were available at wage 
rates properly reflecting the allegedly low productivity of low-skilled workers, then 
there would be more demand for low-skilled work (Kommission für Zukunftsfragen 
der Freistaaten Bayern und Sachsen 1997). 
There were different strands of these arguments: In a neo-liberal vein, the argument 
was in favor of breaking up the structure of collective bargaining (Berthold und 
Stettes 2000), either by allowing works councils to negotiate local wage deals that 
would undercut the regionally agreed rates ‘in favor’ of unemployed job applicants, 
or by requesting trade unions themselves to introduce lower entrance wage 
categories for these groups. The ‘social-democratic’ version of the argument was 
about subsidizing employers’ wage costs, or complementing low wages with subsidies 
paid directly to the employee (‘negative income tax’), or both (Heinze und Streeck 
2000).  
2.2 Empirical development of the ‘low wage sector’ 
Despite public talk about a low-wage ‘sector’, wages are, of course, stratified in a 
continuous way, and any definition of low wage thresholds is purely conventional. 
According to a widely accepted definition also used by the OECD, wages below two 
thirds of the median wage are regarded as ‘low wages’. 
While the alleged necessity of developing a ‘low-wage sector’ in Germany was still 
under heated debate, such a sector was actually already existent, and it started 
expanding  without, at first, any institutional reforms that would have worked in 
favor of it. Considering hourly wages of all dependent employees (i.e. including part-
time workers and very short part-time, the so-called mini jobs  see p. 8), the turn 
came in 1998 and led from 15 per cent to about 21 per cent in 2006, with a slight 
decline since then (Figure 2 - Kalina und Weinkopf 2010).3  
                                            
3  Because of the wide wage gap between East and West Germany, low-wage thresholds and 
percentages were calculated separately for the two regions, of which the figures reported here for 
Germany a s a whole are weighted averages. 
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Figure 2: Numbers of low-wage earners (millions), with low-wage 
thresholds calculated separately for West and East Germany*) 
for each calendar year 
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Source: Kalina und Weinkopf 2010 
*) statistical low-wage thresholds (2/3 of the median wage) in 2008: West Germany 9,50 Euros, East 
Germany 6,87 Euros 
Whether the expansion of the low-wage-segment has improved the chances for low-
skilled workers of taking up employment, as intended by its proponents, has not yet 
been seriously investigated. A purely descriptive inspection does not exactly support 
the view that low-skilled workers would have benefited to great extent. Continuing 
the time series of Figure 1 shows no sustained improvement in the relative position 
of the unskilled with regard to unemployment rates, but rather a continued widening 
of the gap, expressed in Figure 3 as ratios of the unemployment rates of the unskilled 
and those with certified vocational skills (2-3 years apprenticeship or equivalent). By 
contrast, focusing on employment rates rather than unemployment rates, the picture 
is slightly more favorable: The relative employment position of the unskilled has 
improved since about 1996, with setbacks in the recessions 2001  2004 and 2008. 
The apparent riddle of an increasing skills gap with regard to unemployment and a 
closing skills gap with regard to employment can be resolved by assuming that 
unskilled employment growth was fed more from the previously inactive than from 
the unemployed. If we are to assume a causal relationship with the expansion of low 
wages at all (which, of course, cannot be established with these descriptive data), 
then we must conclude that ‘low wage policies’ have not solved the problem that 
was referred to for their justification. 
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Figure 3: Ratios of skill-specific employment and unemployment rates4, 
25 to <65 years of age, 1991 to 2008 
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Source: German microcensus (labor force survey), calculations by Martin Brussig 
The growth of the low-wage sector has arguably contributed to overall wage 
constraint. During the 2000’s, earnings in Germany have declined in real terms, and 
so has the wage share (Bispinck 2011). Per unit labor costs in Germany have lagged 
behind major competitors. This has contributed to Germany’s success in exports, but 
also to the imbalances currently threatening the Euro zone (Hein 2011). With regard 
to employment, however, it has been argued that Germany’s export boost through 
wage restraint has created fewer jobs in export-oriented industries than Germany 
has forgone to create by starving its domestic market (Horn et al. 2010). 
It was only until after the labor market reforms culminating in 2005 (see 4.2 for 
further details) when the public discourse about the ‘low-wage sector’ shifted from 
treating it as a contested proposition to acknowledging it as a reality and, 
increasingly, perhaps also a problem. 
2.3 Wage regulation 
Like Austria and the Scandinavian countries, Germany has no universal statutory 
minimum wage. These countries share a tradition of autonomous wage-setting by the 
social partners through collective bargaining without interference by the state. In 
Germany, the autonomy of the social partners in wage-setting is enshrined as a 
                                            
4  In order to inspect employment and unemployment in a consistent database, these data were 
calculated from the German microcensus using ILO definitions. A skills-specific breakdown of the 
administrative unemployment count gives the impression of a slightly less negative outcome for the 
unskilled (cf. Möller 2011). 
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constitutional principle. This tradition explains reluctance to embrace the idea of a 
universal statutory minimum wage, even among trade unions until not so long ago. 
Strictly legally speaking, collective agreements in Germany are only binding between 
parties who are members of the contracting organizations, i.e. trade unions and 
employers’ associations. However, employers normally do not discriminate against 
non-members of trade unions5 because this would only boost union membership. On 
the employers’ side, however, membership in the contracting association is crucial 
for the applicability of the sectoral collective agreements. Employers’ associations 
have responded to some employers’ reluctance to join by offering a second-tier 
membership status entitling to the services provided by the association but not 
implying to become part of the collective agreements. As a consequence, 
percentages of employees covered by collective agreements have declined 
considerably (see Figure 4). Coverage in the East has generally been lower, since the 
system of industrial relations established in West Germany never fully took root in 
the East after unification. In a way, German unification can be seen as a trigger for 
the partial erosion of Germany’s collective bargaining system. 
Figure 4: Percentages of employees in establishments covered by 
sectoral/regional collective agreements, 1996 to 2010 
 
Source: Ellguth und Kohaut 2011 
It should be noted, however, that coverage by a collective agreement does not 
automatically preclude wages below the statistical low-wage threshold, nor does 
non-coverage necessarily imply low wages. About 16 per cent of agreed wage 
                                            
5  There are no ‘closed shops’ in Germany since the free choice to join or not to join a union is a 
constitutional right of workers. 
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categories are currently (2011) below the low-wage threshold (Bispinck und WSI-
Tarifarchiv 2011) of around 9 Euros per hour established empirically for 20086 (Kalina 
und Weinkopf 2010)  which is not to say, of course, that the same percentage of the 
workforce would be employed in such categories. 
Beyond the immediate coverage of collective agreements, there are four additional 
ways of wage regulation in Germany. The Collective Bargaining Act 
(Tarifvertragsgesetz - 1) traditionally foresees a procedure for erga omnes rulings: 
Upon request by either of the collective bargaining parties and with the approval of 
the Tariff Committee comprised of equal numbers of union and employers’ umbrella 
organisation representatives, an existing collective agreement already binding 
employers who employ at least 50 per cent of the workforce concerned can be 
declared universally binding for the whole sector in question, if this is considered to 
be in the public interest. The use of the erga omnes clause has declined from 5.4 of 
the collective agreements in 1991 to 1.5 per cent in 2009 (Bispinck 2010), partly due 
to the resistance by employers’ umbrella organizations even against the declared 
intentions of the sectoral employers’ associations directly concerned. 
In order to circumvent the obstruction of employers’ umbrella organizations, the 
legislator has introduced erga omnes mechanisms of various sort into other laws, like 
the Posting of Workers Act (2), the Minimum Working Conditions Act (3) and the 
Temporary Work Agency Act (3). Bound by the tradition of free collective bargaining, 
the underlying rationale in all these cases has been that first there must be some 
more or less representative collective agreement which is then extended, via various 
mechanisms, to become universally binding only within the respective sector. 
Technical variations between the four mechanisms concern thresholds of 
representativeness of the agreement to be extended and the level of consensus 
needed to justify government action. The result of these regulations is a variegated 
patchwork of sectoral minimum wages scattered around the statistical low-wage 
thresholds. The procedures hitherto available do not provide a solution for situations 
where there is not any collective agreement to begin with, and they suffer stalemate 
when there is no consensus between the social partners concerned or wherever 
quarrels arise on either side about who is legitimately representing a given sector. 
The paradigm shift from extending the results of collective bargaining to 
complementing collective bargaining still has to be made. 
3 Small earnings 
Up to here, this article has dealt with low (hourly) wages, as far as available 
statistics allow their identification, and not explicitly with small (individual) 
earnings. Whereas both are obviously related, low wages may nevertheless, to some 
degree and within legal and physical limits, be compensated by long hours (as is 
typical for the security services industry), and low earnings may have causes other 
                                            
6  This is the benchmark for Germany as a whole, which is used here since some of the collective 
agreements apply nation-wide. More recent measurements are not available. 
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than low wages. They might result from unprofitable self-employment, or from 
dependent part-time employment with short hours. Over the year or over a workers’ 
career, they might also result from discontinuity of employment. 
3.1 Promotion of small earnings in the German employment regime 
The German employment regime is rife with institutions and mechanisms that 
restrict labor market participation and indirectly incentivize small earnings, most of 
which are related to a ‘conservative’ gender regime modernized only half way: 
 In West Germany, i.e. for four fifths of the population, childcare facilities are 
insufficient so that full labor market participation is extremely difficult for carers 
of young children. The normal pattern is that mothers interrupt their careers 
after childbirth, return only part-time and resume working full-time only when 
their children are well in their teens, or never.  
 The social insurance system supports spouses’ non-participation or only marginal 
participation in the labor market, be they parents or not, by providing derived 
entitlements to dependents and survivors free of contributions. The tax system 
works in the same direction by first pooling married couples’ incomes and then 
applying the tax progression table to half of the family income for each of them 
separately. This ‘tax splitting’ system provides indirect subsidies to couples with 
unequal earnings. Together with the social insurance system, it creates high 
marginal taxation for partners who would expand their labor market participation 
and earnings. 
 ‘Marginal’ part-time employment, since 2003 called ‘mini jobs’, grew out of this 
system already in the 1960s. Small jobs earning currently no more than 400 Euros 
per month are exempt from employees’ social insurance contributions, assuming 
that the worker is already covered through her or his partner, parents or through 
other systems like students’ health insurance. Income taxation is taken care of by 
the employer through a flat-rate withholding regardless of the employee’s 
household income. With a total of 7.4 million mini-jobs and 4.9 million persons 
working a mini-job as their only job (around 12 per cent of the gainfully 
employed population, two thirds of them female), the mini-job has become a 
kind of cornerstone of the German employment system. By its very definition, the 
mini-job is a low-earnings job, and since its threshold has not been raised since 
2003, maximum earnings allowed from mini-jobs have decreased in real terms. 
 Although the widespread perception that employment careers have become more 
volatile and patchwork-like overall is not supported by suitable panel data, this 
finding does hold true for the low-skilled (Giesecke und Heisig 2010): They are 
not only threatened by low wages but their annual and life-time earnings are 
further depressed by more frequent career interruptions after job loss. 
All these mechanisms work in gender-specific ways: In practice, low earnings 
instigated by the employment system are predominantly female earnings. The 
tendency for ‘small’ jobs is also reflected in statistics of working time: Whereas 
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Germany’s female employment rate has grown steadily from 2000 to 2009 by almost 
9 percentage points, the female full-time equivalent employment rate has actually 
fallen between 2001 and 2005, and its growth over the whole period was less than 
5 percentage points (European Commission, Directorate-General for Employment, 
Social Affairs & Equal Opportunities 2010, S. 171). In other words, the ‘cake of work’ 
women are sharing has grown more slowly than the number of women sharing it. 
3.2 The role of ‘activating’ labor market policies 
The ‘activating’ turn in social policy, and, in particular, in labor market or 
‘employment’ policies potentially reinforces the trend towards lower earnings. 
Criteria for ‘acceptable’ jobs which cannot be refused have been considerably 
tightened. Since 1997, qualification status is no longer of concern. After a person has 
been receiving contribution-based unemployment benefits for six months, any job is 
acceptable paying at least the amount of the benefit, which implies a wage cut of 
roughly one third compared to the former wage. Unemployed persons lacking 
(sufficient) unemployment insurance entitlements or having exhausted them and 
therefore receiving means-tested minimum income benefits (see 4.2 for details) have 
to accept any job they can physically and mentally perform, regardless of earnings. 
Empirical findings, though still incomprehensive, tend to support the view that ‘work 
first’ policies have contributed to the downgrading of the earnings structure. 
According to representative surveys, employers have reported that both unemployed 
job applicants and incumbent workers became more prepared to make concessions 
about pay and working conditions (Rebien und Kettner 2011). Among the recipients of 
minimum income benefits who have taken up work, only one third has got an open-
ended full-time contract, almost 50 per cent earn less than 7.5 Euros per hour (which 
is well below the low-wage threshold), and about one quarter have accepted a job 
below their certified skills level (Achatz und Trappmann 2009). In other words, in the 
absence of an effective floor for wages and earnings, ‘work first’ policies contribute 
to the expansion of low wages and small earnings.  
4 Poverty despite employment 
4.1 In-work poverty at household level 
Poverty cannot be linked to low wages or earnings directly since it is not assessed at 
individual but at household level. Living together with family members can mediate 
the relationship between earnings and poverty in very diverse ways: It can mean to 
be saved from poverty by having a better-earning partner, but it can also mean being 
poor despite individually sufficient earnings because of living with children as a lone 
parent, or with an unemployed partner. 
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Table 1:  Rates of population at risk of poverty despite being employed 
at least 6 in 12 months, after social transfers, 2006, selected 
EU member states 
 AT BE DE DK ES FR IT NL SE UK 
total 6.1 4.3 7.4 4.1 10.7 6.7 9.8 4.6 6.4 8.0 
male 6.3 4.4 6.8 4.9 12.0 7.0 11.7 4.6 7.0 8.3 
female 5.7 4.3 8.2 3.2 8.8 5.9 6.9 4.6 5.8 7.7 
Source: Statistisches Bundesamt 2011 
According to the latest available figures based on EU-SILC data, German in-work 
poverty risk rates after social transfers appear quite considerable (Table 1). 
Furthermore, among the countries selected, Germany is the only one where the 
poverty risk rate is higher for women than for men. Unfortunately, the available data 
do not allow disentangling the effects of the gender pay gap, restrained labor market 
participation of women, and possibly insufficient provisions for lone parents who are, 
in practice, predominantly female. 
4.2 The reformed minimum income benefit system working as a supplement to 
low earnings 
From 2005, two benefits for workless people without unemployment insurance claims 
were merged into a single new one, called ‘minimum income benefit for jobseekers’ 
(for details, see Knuth 2007, 2009). Introducing a new gliding scale of disregard for 
earned income, meant to incentivize taking up employment, was part of the reform. 
This mechanism of gradual benefit withdrawal works like earned income tax credits 
in other countries, except that there is no threshold in terms of a minimum of hours 
or earnings before the subsidy begins. Obviously, here again, there is a mechanism in 
place that works in favor of accepting low earnings. 
After two subsequent amendments which demonstrate the uncertainty about the 
objectives and mechanisms of such an in-work benefit, the formula of disregard for 
monthly earned income is currently as follows: 
 the first 100 Euros are disregarded completely; 
 of the part of earnings that fall between 100 and 1,000 Euros, 20 per cent may be 
kept by the benefit recipient; 
 of the part of earnings between 1,000 and 1,200 Euros (1,500 Euros for persons 
having to maintain at least one child, only 10 per cent may be kept); 
 the part of earnings exceeding 1,200 Euros is fully counted against the benefit 
which means that in most cases recipience of the benefit will end. 
Because of the principle of equal treatment, this provision not only works as an 
incentive for benefit recipients to take up work even if resulting earnings are 
insufficient for their families’ needs but also as an invitation to those who already 
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are low earners or breadwinners of families too large for their earnings capacity to 
claim benefits. Consequently, the percentage of claimants receiving the benefit 
despite being engaged in paid work rose from 18 in 2005 to 27 in December, 2008 
(Hartmann und Bergdolt 2010), equivalent to 1.3 million persons. In the absence of 
an effective wage bottom as well as an accepted norm for female labor market 
participation, in-work benefits will continue to resemble a picture puzzle: What looks 
like an incentive to take up work and reduce benefit recipiency in one perspective, 
will appear like a subsidy for wage-dumping, or for optimizing work-leisure-income 
balances, or for sustaining traditional family models from another perspective. 
5 Summary and Conclusions 
With a focus on low wages, small earnings and poverty, we see a Germany quite 
different from how it used to be depicted in international typologies. The ‘co-
ordinated economy’ has allowed the development of vast loopholes in which there is 
no effective wage regulation at all, and employers’ umbrella organizations are 
obstructing attempts to close such loopholes through erga omnes regulations. 
Traditionally considered a high-wage/high quality economy, Germany has developed 
a substantial low-wage segment, and wages have been stagnating overall. Small 
annual and lifetime earnings have for long been typical for (West) German women, 
and though family and educational policies have come into motion in recent years, 
there is not yet an unequivocal strategy for overcoming the ‘conservative’ family 
model. Poverty, for long considered an impossibility in Germany, has become a 
reality of which this article only touched the aspect of in-work poverty.  
Alleviating in-work poverty through income supplements can be a very costly strategy 
if the causes for insufficient household income are not addressed or even reinforced. 
Undoubtedly, low hourly wages are among these causes  however, public discourse 
tends to disregard the many factors mediating between hourly wages and household 
poverty, many of which are also causes of poverty by themselves. The German 
strategy regarding wages, earnings and income in the lower strata of the employment 
system has been paradoxical and fragmented: For a long time, the growth of a low-
wage segment was depicted as desirable for creating or safeguarding jobs for the 
low-skilled, and overall wage restraint is still seen as a virtue today. The linkages 
between female employment patterns, wage structures and household poverty are 
not adequately addressed. When viewing these fields in conjunction, the message is 
simple and clear: If it is no longer possible for lower-skilled males to earn a ‘family 
wage’ even at a very moderate living standard, as used to be the case in the ‘golden 
age’ of Fordism, and if these males are to have families nevertheless, then the 
mothers of their children must have access to full-time employment and equivalent 
careers at equal wages, which implies in turn that public childcare must become the 
norm from a very early age on. The same applies to high-skilled couples who can no 
longer maintain the living standards they aspire to in single-breadwinner 
arrangements. But even accepting that family wages are no longer attainable for 
single earners, there must be a bottom to wages that allows a single full-time worker 
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to live without supplementary benefits. Only with an effective minimum wage 
regulation and with an institutional framework that gives wives and mothers both the 
possibility and the incentive to participate fully in the labor market, supplementing 
earned incomes where families are still in need and designing such supplements in 
ways that incentivize employment are good investments and not just sunk costs. 
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